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 Since I began circulating drafts of an article arguing that certain law school officials have 
exposed themselves to professional discipline by engaging in dishonest marketing tactics,
1
 responses have varied considerably.  Everyone seems to agree, however, that law school 
officials should not lie in their pursuit of students.  There also appears to be broad consensus that 
misleading (albeit not intentionally false) marketing—such as systematically skewed salary 
statistics—is an unfortunate phenomenon, although disagreement remains on just how serious a 
problem it is and what level of corrective effort is appropriate.  In their recently-published 
response pieces, Kyle McEntee of Law School Transparency (“LST”) and Professor Jeffrey 
Stake offer two new avenues for improving the accuracy of law school marketing.  Stake 
explains a theory under which law schools could be held liable for publishing inaccurate 
information through lawsuits filed by students who—but for the inaccuracies—would have either 
spent less on their legal education or avoided law school entirely.
2
  If successful, such lawsuits 
would both provide justice to misled tuition payers and deter future misconduct by law schools.  
McEntee proposes a certification program under which LST would verify the accuracy of law 




 I will begin my reply with a free suggestion to would-be plaintiffs encouraged by 
Professor Stake’s legal theory.  Hurry.  You will certainly feel foolish if your rankings fraud suit 
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is dismissed because of a statute of limitations.
4
  With respect to the merits of the theory, I am 
especially intrigued by the idea of plaintiffs who turned down scholarship money offered by a 
lower-ranked school so they could attend a higher-ranked school.
5
  These potential plaintiffs 
could avoid one problem facing the actual plaintiffs who have sued various law schools, the 
highly speculative nature of their alleged damages.  For the actual plaintiffs, the complaint boils 
down to something like the following:  (1) I was not sure if I should attend law school, and in the 
event I decided to attend, I was not sure about what law school to attend.  (2)  Relying upon 
certain representations, I matriculated at Defendant Law School (“DLS”).  (3)  I later learned that 
these representations were false.  The rest is commentary.
6
  A big problem with this theory of 
liability is that even if one accepts the plaintiff’s claims at face value, one can dispute whether 
attending DLS actually harmed the plaintiff.  Just how terrible is the plaintiff’s post-law school 
life?  Is she malingering, or is she working as hard as possible to find well-paying work?  Will 
her law degree prove valuable one day, or is it worthless?  Would her life have turned out 
differently if she had attended some other law school, or is she so incompetent that even with a 
Yale Law School degree she would be jobless?
7
  And if she had skipped law school, what would 
she have tried instead, and how would she have fared?  Lawyers for various DLSs have so far 
mostly avoided reaching this stage of analysis by winning at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  
Supporters of these suits should realize, however, that if judges allow law school alumni lawsuits 
to proceed, and if juries then find the defendant law schools liable, the plaintiffs face real 
challenges at the damages stage. 
 Not so with Professor Stake’s potential plaintiffs, whose complaints can be summarized 
as follows:  (1) I was admitted both to Truth-Telling Law School (“TTLS”) and to Defendant 
Law School (“DLS”).  (2) I considered attending TTLS because it would have cost me less 
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money than attending DLS, where I ultimately did matriculate.  (3) I chose to pay more at DLS 
because that school was ranked above TTLS.  (4) As it turns out, DLS was ranked above TTLS 
in part because of its fraudulent publication of false information.
8
  Here, if one accepts a 
plaintiff’s premises, calculating damages is simple.  The defendant owes the extra money the 
plaintiff spent to attend DLS instead of TTLS,
9
 a figure one can calculate after consulting the 
nominal tuition and fees charged by each school along with the scholarship offers, if any, 
presented to the plaintiff.
10
 
Further, compared to the actual plaintiffs law schools have faced so far, Professor Stake’s 
potential plaintiffs should have an easy time proving reliance.  The actual plaintiffs have faced 
the tricky task of convincing courts that they truly read law school employment statistics and that 
the statistics genuinely affected the plaintiffs’ decisions to enroll.  Even the most honest plaintiff 
must overcome the suspicion that his memory is colored by bias; his incentive to recall himself 
relying on rosy statistics is immense.  And even if a court assumes reliance when considering a 
motion to dismiss, the judge can deem the reliance unreasonable, as some plaintiffs have 
learned.
11
  But under the new rankings fraud theory, allegations of reliance become quite 
credible.  Indeed, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of law school rankings to 
prospective students. 
With the next set of Professor Stake’s potential plaintiffs, those who would not have 
attended law school at all but for misleading employment statistics,
12
 the difficulty of calculating 
damages returns with full force.  Like the actual law graduate plaintiffs, this class of hypothetical 
litigants must somehow prove that their law school educations were not worth their price.
13
  The 
value of a law school degree is the subject of some controversy.  I have read serious suggestions 
that for some alumni, law degrees have negative economic value; they not only failed to provide 
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legal jobs but also hinder the search for non-legal employment.  On the other hand, two scholars 
suggest in a forthcoming paper that the median value of a law degree is around $1 million.
14
  For 
now at least, I will stay out of the law degree valuation debate, other than to note the tremendous 
uncertainty surrounding any projection about the economic value of a course of study, 
particularly decades into the future.
15
  In addition, even if economists can offer a fair estimate of 
the median value of a law degree (that is, the median lifetime earning premium obtained by 
attending law school, compared to a similarly situated college graduate who does not), real 
lawsuits require the calculation of damages suffered by a specific person, whose life outcomes 
may not resemble projected medians.
16
 
In any event, I am pleased to have Prof. Stake on board the anti-dishonesty bandwagon, 
and I appreciate his plain statement that “the lying in which law schools have engaged is plainly 
deplorable behavior deserving severe punishment.”17  Further, while he raises a few concerns 
about potential problems associated with subjecting law school officials to professional 
discipline for dishonest marketing (for example, someone who participated in dishonesty might 
be discouraged from blowing the whistle by fears of personal punishment),
18
 he does not dispute 
my conclusion that dishonest law school marketing—if committed by lawyers—can violate 
existing regulations governing lawyers and can accordingly justify professional sanctions.
19
  
McEntee agrees that professional discipline is appropriate.
20
 
So far, I have yet to see anyone respond to my article by arguing something to the effect 
of:  “Under current law governing lawyers, a law school dean may brazenly lie to prospective 
students about matters material to their choice of where (and whether) to matriculate without fear 
of professional sanctions.”  The closest I have seen might be this comment of Prof. Andrew 
Perlman: 
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I’m also a little bit concerned about interpreting Rule 8.4(c) as expansively as 
[Trachtenberg] suggests.  If a lawyer could be disciplined for making misleading 
statements on matters of public import, I wonder how many politicians (many of 
whom are lawyers) would be subject to disciplinary proceedings under this 
understanding of Rule 8.4(c)?
21
 
I think, however, that important distinctions can be made between dishonest law school 
marketing and dishonest political speech.  First, the very term “political speech” signals the 
important First Amendment concerns that would be presented should bar counsel seek to punish 
a politician who, say, falsely accused an opponent of cutting Medicare benefits.  Second, even I 
would not recommend applying Rule 8.4(c) to the kind of nonfalsifiable puffery common in 
educational marketing.  Claims like “students receive useful hands-on practice experience in our 
clinics” ought to be beyond the scope of “dishonesty” charges—unless, of course, such 
statements were uttered concerning a school with no clinics at all.  The misrepresentation and 
deceit that I believe worthy of bar counsel’s attention is quite different from statements like “we 
have a collegial environment.”22 
Recall that my article begins with stories of two American law schools whose officials 
engaged in knowing deceit—for years—about the credentials of their incoming students (their 
standardized test scores and undergraduate grade point averages).
23
  They intentionally sent this 
false information to the American Bar Association, to prospective students, and to U.S. News & 
World Report, which used the bogus data to give the schools inflated rankings.  As Prof. Stake 
has documented (and as is understood intuitively by those who pay attention to law school 
admissions), these rankings significantly affected matriculation decisions and likely caused at 
least some students to pay tens of thousands of extra tuition dollars to attend the offending 
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schools.  Will anyone state directly that the deans responsible for those falsifications cannot 
properly be punished by the bar?  Would such punishment really start us down the path to 
sanctions against United States Senators who break campaign promises? 
If we can accept that brazen falsehoods in the service of “rankings fraud” are properly 
punishable, then deciding what other misleading law school marketing can justify bar discipline 
becomes an exercise in line drawing.  Reasonable minds may differ about just how sloppy a 
school’s alumni salary statistics may be before a lawyer responsible for their publication should 
be accused of “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”  For those who disapprove of 
suddenly punishing law school officials for conduct common in legal education, advisory bar 
opinions can provide fair notice that certain forms of marketing will no longer be tolerated. 
Although much of the response to my article has concerned the propriety of punishment, 
McEntee helpfully directs his attention to how we might avoid misleading marketing in the first 
place.  Yes, punishing wrongdoing deters future misconduct.  And formally announcing the 
disapproval of the community has its own value.
24
  But as I mentioned near the end of the article, 
constructive solutions will largely help law schools do the right thing instead of reacting to those 
that do wrong.
25
  One’s heart must be truly hardened to prefer that colleagues stray and be 
chastised rather than reform and prosper.
26
 
McEntee essentially argues that existing regulatory bodies cannot repair the damage law 
schools have inflicted upon their own reputations.
27
  In particular, he deems the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) slow moving and lacking in credibility.  (As an aside, I will note that if 
McEntee is correct, then he has severely weakened one of the more plausible arguments against 
using bar discipline to curb misleading law school marketing.  Prof. Stake, for example, writes 
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that “tailoring and clarification of the ABA standards will be more important than increasing the 
personal punishment lawyers face for being involved in misreporting.”28  Prof. Perlman predicts 
“that the solution is better ABA/AALS standards rather than lawyer discipline.”29  These 
responses lose force if the ABA cannot handle its responsibilities.)  McEntee raises fair 
criticisms.  While the ABA has made recent statements indicating that it takes seriously its role 
in the fight against deceptive law school marketing,
30
 the organization spent years doing little-to-
nothing about the chicanery now widely understood (at least by those who care about such 
things) to have been common practice among American law schools.  For example, salary 
statistics touted by law schools misstate the economic reality of recent law graduates because of 
their tendency to oversample the best paid alumni,
31
 and ABA action has been anemic.
32
  Even if 
the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar becomes a dynamic force for 
accurate marketing of legal education, at least some potential law students may discount the 
value of ABA approval, if only because reputations once tarnished are slow to repair. 
To supplement the accreditation work of the ABA, McEntee offers the services of Law 
School Transparency, of which he is the executive director and a co-founder.  Although I cannot 
speculate about the value of LST’s inspection program,33 I am pleased to see LST offer some 
form of constructive services.  It is easy, in a sense, for someone like me to criticize law school 
administrators and regulators.  After all, I neither run a law school nor regulate those who do, 
and I accordingly will not face the challenge of meeting my own proposed standards.  In 
addition, a prospective law student who reads my article might acquire some appropriate 
skepticism concerning statistics presented in law school websites and viewbooks.  That 
skepticism, however, does not easily translate into the ability to discern which law schools are 
more and less trustworthy.  If prospective law students know which schools disseminate shady 
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statistics, then those schools should (if my introductory economics instructors told me the truth) 
be slapped by the invisible hand.  If the wrongdoers can evade detection in a sea of “everyone 
does it” cynicism, market discipline will arrive more slowly, if at all.  
To help honest schools earn the credit they deserve, LST proposes to review law school 
marketing materials and certify their trustworthiness.  Perhaps LST would also help law schools 
produce accurate marketing materials if hired to do so.  While the devil remains in the details, I 
commend LST for offering what could be a valuable service, and I wish McEntee and his 
colleagues all success.  If other organizations can offer competing third-party certification—
ideally without creating so much confusion as to undermine their purpose—so much the better.  
Efforts like the proposed LST program will be useful regardless of how the ABA performs.  If 
the ABA response to misleading marketing remains inadequate, then outside auditors can 
concurrently provide well-behaved law schools with a credible seal of approval while also 
arming the ABA’s critics with important data.  If the ABA performs well, then additional third-
party certification can offer incentives to schools who wish to attain accuracy above the 
regulatory-mandated minimum. 
In the end, however, school-selected third-party number crunchers are no substitute for 
effective accreditation.  Profs. Stake and Perlman are correct that whatever one’s opinion of 
using bar discipline to discourage malfeasance by law school officials, an active ABA possesses 
tools far better calibrated for quickly influencing the behavior of law schools.  When the ABA 
tells law schools to jump, they may not ask “how high,” but they eventually get their feet off of 
the ground.  Even Prof. Brian Tamanaha, by no means an unquestioning fan of ABA 
accreditation standards,
34
 recognizes their power to effect changes desired by those who draft the 
regulations.  Any law school dean will tell you that if an ABA site visit report identifies some 
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apparent shortcoming, a law school is usually better off addressing the problem than arguing.
35
  
As far as I know, however, site visit teams do not include an assessment of law school marketing 
in their reports.
36
  In a world without any intentional falsification in law school marketing, it 
would still be useful for ABA reports to advise law schools on how they might better comply 
with Standard 509.
37
  (As a point of comparison, I will note that in one recent ABA report I have 
had the chance to review, the site visit team found space to address the rigor with which teachers 
enforce attendance requirements, the level of administrative support for the externship program, 
the number of academic credits awarded to various journal editors, the number of linear feet of 
library shelving, and the square footage of co-curricular activity space.  While the report did 
mention some areas related to Standard 509, it did not assess the accuracy of the school’s 
published employment statistics.) 
As it happens, we do not live in a world in which intentionally deceptive law school 
marketing is some “scamblog” fantasy.  Further, while only a few examples of brazen deceit 
have thus far come to light, misleading statistics pervade law school publications.  For the ABA 
to combat misleading law school marketing with any chance of success, it must envisage itself 
more like the Securities and Exchange Commission and less like the Chamber of Commerce.  
Both organizations have a place in American economic and political life, but only one is a 
regulator. 
American legal education enjoys tremendous privilege.  The federal government lends 
our customers whatever it takes to pay our tuition, along with living expenses, all while asking 
pretty much no questions.  If the student later cannot pay back the money, that is a problem for 
the borrower and the lender; the law school has no skin in the game.  Concurrently, many law 
schools receive state funding through public university systems, and even nominally private law 
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schools benefit from tax law provisions designed to promote education, such as the income tax 
deduction for charitable donations and the exemption of schools from local real property taxes.  
These legal benefits are not enshrined in the Constitution of the United States.  Federal and state 
governments have given them to us, largely in the form of legislation, and those governments 
can take them away if we exhibit sufficiently bad behavior. 
Lawsuits against deceitful law schools may be useful.  The same is true of third-party 
certification of honest law schools.  And bar discipline may too have something to offer, if only a 
chance for the legal profession to condemn injustice perpetrated by its own members.  Yet 
without a good regulator, law schools will continue to mislead consumers, and eventually the 
public that so generously funds legal education may run out of patience. 
                                                          
*
 Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Law.  I thank Kyle McEntee and Jeff Stake for their 
thoughtful responses to my article, as well as the Nebraska Law Review for soliciting and editing their commentary 
and my own reply.  I also thank Scott Norberg, Andrew Perlman, and others who have taken time to discuss legal 
education with me over the past year. 
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